64 Squeeze – The Weak
Triangle
by John Anderson
The West Coast Offense has had some
different types of pass schemes installed in the overall scheme. One of those is
the Weak Side Triangle, a play where three receivers attack a side of the field
at various depths. This is done in several ways, of which we will cover one of
them.
I want to go through this in a fashion
so that we can see how a pass play is designed from square one. In this way, the
line of thought can be conveyed and displayed in a way that shows how different
variations are considered. So, what we are going to do is examine how to
establish a pattern from the very beginning using a play that is common in the
WCO at various
levels.
The play we are going to display is in
the category of the weak triangle, which is in our system as “64 Squeeze”. This
play starts with the Split End (SE) running the Hook/Out route. The Hook or Out
route will vary according to the strengths of the quarterback and the split end.
We had always used our split end as the focal point of our pass offense, and
this play typifies
that ideal. Once you have made the decision on what you
want to feature in this play, you have to establish the play, execute the play,
and force the defense to stop the play.
Pass protection schemes are only limited
by how many you want to place in the pass route at any given time. They also
limited by the formation you wish to you at any given time.
- WCO note – the
play in question here is known in the WCO terminology as “X Hook”. When
run to the tight end side of the field, “Z Hook”.
This play is in the playbook of
every offense. But, for the sake of the example, we will have “X” run the out
route on this play,
Now, lets look at the basic 64 route. The
split end will run any of about five different patterns, but the Hook/Out route
is the main feature. The running back who is set to the weak side will run a
swing or wide route to the sideline.
This is one of the first plays installed
in camp. The basic idea is to run off the defensive back in coverage, and throw
underneath to the out/hook route. The running back is used to draw any
underneath coverage outside away from the split end and not allow him to drop to
take away the hook/out route. If the linebacker drops off to take away the
hook/out route, the quarterback simply throws the ball to the running back, who
at this time is running up to receive the ball and run up the sideline. This is
a simple front/back option keying on the outside linebacker.
- WCO note – the
basic route for the back in the WCO is the Shoot route.
This would
also be true for a slot receiver who is taking the place of the running back in
the route.
Now, the basic reaction of a defense is to slide the
outside linebacker outside to cover the flat, and drop the inside linebacker
farther out and deep into the curl zone underneath to take away the split ends
route. Another reaction is for the defense to rotate the safety over top, and
settle the corner into the flat to take away the running back. The inside
linebacker in this variation will now drop off into the curl zone to take away
the hook route. If we allow the inside linebacker to do this, they will have
taken away the weakside option with a two-on-three advantage favoring the
defense. To resolve this situation, we will drag another receiver from the
strong side to the play side to take advantage of the vacant area in zone
coverage. This may also apply is many combination or man coverage schemes as
well.
Notice that in this formation, we have a
extra receiver on the line of scrimmage, which also draws up the strong safety.
This could be used in the favor of the offense to force an adjustment by the
defense and create match ups that also favor the offense.
Many defensive teams will send the inside
linebacker to support the corners if they feel that the outside linebacker can
adequately take care of flat responsibility.
Now that we have examined the basic
situations we run into concerning what the defense does to stop the weak side
option, lets look at what to do with the underneath coverage. Keep in mind that
this is not exhaustive.
1) Drag a receiver from the strong side over – One of the ways to control
the inside linebacker is to drag the tight end, or another receiver, across
underneath the drops of the linebackers. If the inside linebacker drops away too
deep, the tight end is wide open. If the linebacker does NOT drop to take away
the split end, there is a open alley to complete the pass.
This is the same premise used in
most WCO offensives schemes.
2) Play Action – Play action draws up the linebackers, so that you may be
able to get a receiver behind them.
On this
particular play above, the defense is using a Cover 2/4 variation. This is one
that could go either way, dropping the corners deep or settling them in the
shorter zones. The key to this defense is that the match-ups will more than
likely be your split end versus the corner, or your running back on the outside
linebacker. Once you have established your split end or running back (depending
on the defense you see), the tight end coming across may be a viable option
later. But, on the above play, we have placed the extra receiver, in the slot to
the weak side. The defense may not be in the frame of mind to see that this is
the same play, especially if a team is not prone to showing a lot of formation
variation.
The West Coast
offense uses a lot of formation and motion variation. This is also true with
adjusting the splits of the wide receivers. Another aspect of game planning uses
personnel packages in conjunction with running the same formations, so that the
play can appear to be different but still execute the same play. If you have a
running back who is a speed threat, it would make sense to utilize his talents
as a downfield receiver. The National Football League, as well as some major
colleges, used this principle in sending other personnel into wider positions to
gain advantages in the passing game.
Practical
Application – Dallas Cowboys
I learned a
number of things from clinics that were given by Ernie Zampese ( Former
Offensive Coordinator for the San Diego Chargers, Los Angeles Rams, and Dallas
Cowboys). The Dallas Cowboys under Zampese, didn’t have to run a lot of plays,
but what they did run, they ran better than anyone else. Zampese also ran his
own version of the WCO, and used the same precepts and principles he learned at
San Diego and Los Angeles, and brought them to Dallas after Norv Turner left for
Washington. Turner was a quarterback coach under Zampese at Los Angeles, and
took the offensive coordinator job under Jimmy Johnson. So many of the plays you
will see here were run with the same concepts as Walsh had in San Francisco.

On this 2nd and 8 play versus
the Washington Redskins, the Cowboys will line up in their split backs formation
(Red Left). Running back Emmitt Smith and wide receiver Michael Irvin, are to
the right side of the formation. Tight end Jay Novacek is lined up on the left
hand side of the formation. Washington is in a predominately run defense, in
what is sometimes called a “Eagle” on the strong side, in that the line is
overshifted with the defensive end on the outside of the tight end. Linebacker
Andre Collins is lined up on the inside shoulder of the tight end. Linebacker
Matt Millen is in the weakside “A” gap playing a run stopper position.
Both wide receivers will run streak
routes downfield. Emmitt Smith will run the swing route to the weakside. Jay
Novacek will slam release off of linebacker Andre Collins and run his shallow
crossing route, thus making up the triangle route in the pattern.
Quarterback Troy Aikman will see that
Irvin is covered by Corner Darrell Green. Linebacker Wilbur Marshall, who is
playing the weakside end position, cannot get outside quickly enough to take
away the swing route by Smith. Collins and Millen have taken away Novacek.
Aikman sees the advantage on the outside and makes a quick pass to Smith in
rhythm, allowing Smith to gain the sideline for a five yard gain.
Later, in the same game, the Cowboys
will utilize the same play with a little bit of window dressing. This
route looks similar to the “Drive” route. Dallas starts from a slot formation,
and uses motion into a “Bunch” formation. The play is run the same way, and adds
another option in that you have a speed receiver running the shallow crossing
route. The tight end is coming in behind the inside linebacker, pressuring the
safety and the linebacker.
Washington is running a form of match-up
zone, where the corners will run with the wide receivers. Even though the play
seems to be initially covered, Dallas has two chances on this play to be
successful. Dallas has Emmitt Smith on linebacker Monte Coleman, though Coleman
is a quick linebacker. Smith may have a play to turn up the sideline for a few
yards.
Irvin may be able to pick up a step or two on corner
Darrell Green. This crossing route by a speed receiver more times than not will
be a viable option.
This first and ten play shows the
Cowboys in their “Strong I” formation. The Cowboys execute the same play versus
this 3-4 Defense. In a match-up like this, Michael Irvin on corner Tim McKyer is
a match-up favoring the Cowboys. Irvin is too big for McKyer to consistently
cover in a single coverage match-up. But, on this play McKyer does cover Irvin,
and forces
Troy Aikman to check down. Running back Emmitt Smith
doesn’t have a free alley to the sideline, and makes a small crease for tight
end Jay Novacek.
The flanker on this play, Alvin Harper
(80). has a couple different options on this type of play from the close
formation his is aligned in. One would be the fly, or streak route, down the
field. The second would be the fade route down the sideline, running to a point
6 yards away from the sideline, and about 20-22 yards deep.

In this example, the Cowboys run a
variation of the play using a different pass protection scheme. The Cowboys
utilize both backs in protection, and use a “chip” technique at the edge of the
protection using running back Derrick Coleman (44). Fullback Daryl Johnston will
also help on the edge in protection. The Cowboys are trying to neutralize the
effect of the Packers pass rush, and potential blitz situation. Green Bay has
all three of their linebackers within three yards of the line of scrimmage. But,
the Packers will drop into zone coverage, and thus have seven defenders to cover
three initial receivers.
In looking at the coverage at the snap,
the pass protection is excellent. Wide receivers Alvin Harper (80), and Michael
Irvin, will execute their pass routes. Tight end Jay Novacek will execute his
crossing route slightly deeper in this play.
The Packers coverage scheme is
excellent, in that cornerback Terrell Buckley (27) has passed off Harper to
safety George Teague who is playing the deep half of the field behind Buckley.
But, after passing off Harper to the safety help behind him, Buckley drifts
outside and deep. QB Troy Aikman doesn’t see Buckley dropping into his passing
lane, or thinks that he has more room than he does and is deceived by Buckley’s
movements. The timing of the route is flawless, but Buckley drifts into the
passing lane as Aikman throws the ball. Buckley makes the interception and
creates a big play for the Packers.
In this situation, the better option was
for Aikman to dump the ball off to Coleman, seeing he has Novacek to block the
linebacker who is nearest in the area. This is a portion of the play Dallas has
used over the years with great success, but Aikman’s decision making progression
on this play was poor. However, Dallas’ success rate over the years have been
magnificent, just not on this play.
Practical Application – San Francisco
49ers
75/76 Shallow Cross – This play
utilizes the same theory as did Ernie Zampese’s play in Dallas. The Walsh
version used a shorter split by the split end, and usually ran a receiver
underneath him on the shallow cross coming across the field as the primary
receiver. The split end and the running back have the same type
responsibilities, but the route by the tight end is run on a deeper angle going
to 9-10 yards instead of 4-5 yards. The flanker on this play has the primary
responsibility of the man
coverage “alert”. If he detects man coverage, he runs the
seam route which includes a big play opportunity. Otherwise, he tries to draw
two defenders. The checkdown begins with the shallow crossing route, in that he
uses the same technique in reading the coverage as the “Drive” route. Next will
be the tight end, then the split end with the safety valve being the running
back. This will be a five step drop by the quarterback.
1992 game 15 San Francisco at Tampa
Bay 1st and 10 on SF 20
Notice on the above play, that the
fullback takes a short cut to get to the shallow crossing route that is normally
used by a wide receiver. Everything else is normal in the 49er execution of the
“Shallow Cross”.
Quarterback Steve Young (8) sees the flat
angle by the outside linebacker to the split end side. Fullback Tom Rathman (44)
has protection first responsibility to seal the “A” gap to his side, then
release into his route if no linebacker shows
himself in his area of responsibility. As a result of
Rathmans release, and the wide route by running back Amp Lee (22), the
Buccaneers middle linebacker Brownlow (55) rotates straight back instead of
rotating outside to take away the curl zone
area. This opens up the hook route coming open outside of
him by wide receiver Jerry Rice (80). Though cornerback Ricky Reynolds has deep
help from safety Mark Carrier, Carrier cannot get up quickly enough to take away
the route.
The result is first down for San Francisco.
On this first and ten play, the Niners
face a hybrid nickel defense by the Washington Redskins. The Redksins will
show three defensive linemen, three linebackers, and five defensive backs. The
Redskins will run a cover two match up zone concept that “bumps” their
underneath coverage to adjust to any motion.
The 49ers will use a shorter split with
the split end, and align wide receiver Mike Sherrard, in the fullback position
in the backfield. The Redskins will counter with defensive back A.J. Johnson
shadowing Sherrard six yards deep from the line of scrimmage. In this coverage
Johnson will cover the number two receiver to any three receiver side.
At the snap, the Redskins will rush only
three and leave eight in zone coverage.
The Niners will bring wide receiver
Jerry Rice downfield drawing two defenders away from the primary receiver John
Taylor, who is running the shallow cross. If Taylor comes open, Rice will have
cleared some defenders downfield for him. Sherrard comes around Taylor and runs
the twelve yard hook route. Sherrard draws two defenders himself on the
hook
route. Cornerback Darrell Green (28) follows his
responsibility and bumpsoutside to pick up the wide route by fullback Tom
Rathman. Linebacker Andre Collins (55) releases Taylor inside to linebacker
Monte Coleman (51), whom covers Taylor perfectly coming across the formation.
Tight end Brent Jones comes across the formation being trailed by linebacker
Wilbur Marshall. Quarterback Steve Young (8) finds the open Jones, and fires the
ball perfectly into Jones, resulting in a 9 yard gain.
This play requires attention to detail
and flawless execution in which to be successful. For years, the 49ers have
utilized their personnel in the best possible fashion to take advantage of their
strengths and minimize their weaknesses. This play is one of a long line of
plays that point to the precision necessary to sustain play after play,
producing long drives.
The flexibility of the 49ers West Coast
offensive system provides a vast number of possibilities for variation in
personnel packages, formation variation, and motion variation to produce the
desired success.
Conclusion:
In this article, I have attempted to
show how a pass pattern is built upon, and tweeked upon to take advantage
of different defensive packages, coverages, and schemes. Basic patterns can be
built upon to take advantage of whatever weaknesses or mismatches that can be
found. You don’t have to continuously change plays, but vary the same approach
to a point that
it looks like your running many different plays.
But, as always, it still comes down to
precision, execution, and the constant striving for excellence. This also comes
down to a commitment by the players and the coaching staff to excel to be the
best at what they do.
Contact John Anderson here:
abharvest@bellsouth.net