64 Squeeze – The Weak Triangle
by John Anderson

    The West Coast Offense has had some different types of pass schemes installed in the overall scheme. One of those is the Weak Side Triangle, a play where three receivers attack a side of the field at various depths. This is done in several ways, of which we will cover one of them.
    I want to go through this in a fashion so that we can see how a pass play is designed from square one. In this way, the line of thought can be conveyed and displayed in a way that shows how different variations are considered. So, what we are going to do is examine how to establish a pattern from the very beginning using a play that is common in the WCO at various
levels.
    The play we are going to display is in the category of the weak triangle, which is in our system as “64 Squeeze”. This play starts with the Split End (SE) running the Hook/Out route. The Hook or Out route will vary according to the strengths of the quarterback and the split end. We had always used our split end as the focal point of our pass offense, and this play typifies
that ideal. Once you have made the decision on what you want to feature in this play, you have to establish the play, execute the play, and force the defense to stop the play.
    Pass protection schemes are only limited by how many you want to place in the pass route at any given time. They also limited by the formation you wish to you at any given time.

 
This play is in the playbook of every offense. But, for the sake of the example, we will have “X” run the out route on this play,






    Now, lets look at the basic 64 route. The split end will run any of about five different patterns, but the Hook/Out route is the main feature. The running back who is set to the weak side will run a swing or wide route to the sideline.

    This is one of the first plays installed in camp. The basic idea is to run off the defensive back in coverage, and throw underneath to the out/hook route. The running back is used to draw any underneath coverage outside away from the split end and not allow him to drop to take away the hook/out route. If the linebacker drops off to take away the hook/out route, the quarterback simply throws the ball to the running back, who at this time is running up to receive the ball and run up the sideline. This is a simple front/back option keying on the outside linebacker.
 

    This would also be true for a slot receiver who is taking the place of the running back in the route.
Now, the basic reaction of a defense is to slide the outside linebacker outside to cover the flat, and drop the inside linebacker farther out and deep into the curl zone underneath to take away the split ends route. Another reaction is for the defense to rotate the safety over top, and settle the corner into the flat to take away the running back. The inside linebacker in this variation will now drop off into the curl zone to take away the hook route. If we allow the inside linebacker to do this, they will have taken away the weakside option with a two-on-three advantage favoring the defense. To resolve this situation, we will drag another receiver from the strong side to the play side to take advantage of the vacant area in zone coverage. This may also apply is many combination or man coverage schemes as well.

    Notice that in this formation, we have a extra receiver on the line of scrimmage, which also draws up the strong safety. This could be used in the favor of the offense to force an adjustment by the defense and create match ups that also favor the offense.

    Many defensive teams will send the inside linebacker to support the corners if they feel that the outside linebacker can adequately take care of flat responsibility.

    Now that we have examined the basic situations we run into concerning what the defense does to stop the weak side option, lets look at what to do with the underneath coverage. Keep in mind that this is not exhaustive.
 

  1) Drag a receiver from the strong side over – One of the ways to control the inside linebacker is to drag the tight end, or another receiver, across underneath the drops of the linebackers. If the inside linebacker drops away too deep, the tight end is wide open. If the linebacker does NOT drop to take away the split end, there is a open alley to complete the pass.

This is the same premise used in most WCO offensives schemes.
 
    2) Play Action – Play action draws up the linebackers, so that you may be able to get a receiver behind them.






    On this particular play above, the defense is using a Cover 2/4 variation. This is one that could go either way, dropping the corners deep or settling them in the shorter zones. The key to this defense is that the match-ups will more than likely be your split end versus the corner, or your running back on the outside linebacker. Once you have established your split end or running back (depending on the defense you see), the tight end coming across may be a viable option later. But, on the above play, we have placed the extra receiver, in the slot to the weak side. The defense may not be in the frame of mind to see that this is the same play, especially if a team is not prone to showing a lot of formation variation.

    The West Coast offense uses a lot of formation and motion variation. This is also true with adjusting the splits of the wide receivers. Another aspect of game planning uses personnel packages in conjunction with running the same formations, so that the play can appear to be different but still execute the same play. If you have a running back who is a speed threat, it would make sense to utilize his talents as a downfield receiver. The National Football League, as well as some major colleges, used this principle in sending other personnel into wider positions to gain advantages in the passing game.

Practical Application – Dallas Cowboys

    I learned a number of things from clinics that were given by Ernie Zampese ( Former Offensive Coordinator for the San Diego Chargers, Los Angeles Rams, and Dallas Cowboys). The Dallas Cowboys under Zampese, didn’t have to run a lot of plays, but what they did run, they ran better than anyone else. Zampese also ran his own version of the WCO, and used the same precepts and principles he learned at San Diego and Los Angeles, and brought them to Dallas after Norv Turner left for Washington. Turner was a quarterback coach under Zampese at Los Angeles, and took the offensive coordinator job under Jimmy Johnson. So many of the plays you will see here were run with the same concepts as Walsh had in San Francisco.

    On this 2nd and 8 play versus the Washington Redskins, the Cowboys will line up in their split backs formation (Red Left). Running back Emmitt Smith and wide receiver Michael Irvin, are to the right side of the formation. Tight end Jay Novacek is lined up on the left hand side of the formation. Washington is in a predominately run defense, in what is sometimes called a “Eagle” on the strong side, in that the line is overshifted with the defensive end on the outside of the tight end. Linebacker Andre Collins is lined up on the inside shoulder of the tight end. Linebacker Matt Millen is in the weakside “A” gap playing a run stopper position.
    Both wide receivers will run streak routes downfield. Emmitt Smith will run the swing route to the weakside. Jay Novacek will slam release off of linebacker Andre Collins and run his shallow crossing route, thus making up the triangle route in the pattern.
    Quarterback Troy Aikman will see that Irvin is covered by Corner Darrell Green. Linebacker Wilbur Marshall, who is playing the weakside end position, cannot get outside quickly enough to take away the swing route by Smith. Collins and Millen have taken away Novacek. Aikman sees the advantage on the outside and makes a quick pass to Smith in rhythm, allowing Smith to gain the sideline for a five yard gain.
    Later, in the same game, the Cowboys will utilize the same play with a  little bit of window dressing. This route looks similar to the “Drive” route. Dallas starts from a slot formation, and uses motion into a “Bunch” formation. The play is run the same way, and adds another option in that you have a speed receiver running the shallow crossing route. The tight end is coming in behind the inside linebacker, pressuring the safety and the linebacker.
    Washington is running a form of match-up zone, where the corners will run with the wide receivers. Even though the play seems to be initially covered, Dallas has two chances on this play to be successful. Dallas has Emmitt Smith on linebacker Monte Coleman, though Coleman is a quick linebacker. Smith may have a play to turn up the sideline for a few yards.
Irvin may be able to pick up a step or two on corner Darrell Green. This crossing route by a speed receiver more times than not will be a viable option.
    This first and ten play shows the Cowboys in their “Strong I” formation. The Cowboys execute the same play versus this 3-4 Defense. In a match-up like this, Michael Irvin on corner Tim McKyer is a match-up favoring the Cowboys. Irvin is too big for McKyer to consistently cover in a single coverage match-up. But, on this play McKyer does cover Irvin, and forces
Troy Aikman to check down. Running back Emmitt Smith doesn’t have a free alley to the sideline, and makes a small crease for tight end Jay Novacek.
    The flanker on this play, Alvin Harper (80). has a couple different options on this type of play from the close formation his is aligned in. One would be the fly, or streak route, down the field. The second would be the fade route down the sideline, running to a point 6 yards away from the sideline, and about 20-22 yards deep.


    In this example, the Cowboys run a variation of the play using a different pass protection scheme. The Cowboys utilize both backs in protection, and use a “chip” technique at the edge of the protection using running back Derrick Coleman (44). Fullback Daryl Johnston will also help on the edge in protection. The Cowboys are trying to neutralize the effect of the Packers pass rush, and potential blitz situation. Green Bay has all three of their linebackers within three yards of the line of scrimmage. But, the Packers will drop into zone coverage, and thus have seven defenders to cover three initial receivers.
    In looking at the coverage at the snap, the pass protection is excellent. Wide receivers Alvin Harper (80), and Michael Irvin, will execute their pass routes. Tight end Jay Novacek will execute his crossing route slightly deeper in this play.
 
    The Packers coverage scheme is excellent, in that cornerback Terrell Buckley (27) has passed off Harper to safety George Teague who is playing the deep half of the field behind Buckley. But, after passing off Harper to the safety help behind him, Buckley drifts outside and deep. QB Troy Aikman doesn’t see Buckley dropping into his passing lane, or thinks that he has more room than he does and is deceived by Buckley’s movements. The timing of the route is flawless, but Buckley drifts into the passing lane as Aikman throws the ball. Buckley makes the interception and creates a big play for the Packers.
 
    In this situation, the better option was for Aikman to dump the ball off to Coleman, seeing he has Novacek to block the linebacker who is nearest in the area. This is a portion of the play Dallas has used over the years with great success, but Aikman’s decision making progression on this play was poor. However, Dallas’ success rate over the years have been magnificent, just not on this play.



Practical Application – San Francisco 49ers
    75/76 Shallow Cross – This play utilizes the same theory as did Ernie Zampese’s play in Dallas. The Walsh version used a shorter split by the split end, and usually ran a receiver underneath him on the shallow cross coming across the field as the primary receiver. The split end and the running back have the same type responsibilities, but the route by the tight end is run on a deeper angle going to 9-10 yards instead of 4-5 yards. The flanker on this play has the primary responsibility of the man
coverage “alert”. If he detects man coverage, he runs the seam route which includes a big play opportunity. Otherwise, he tries to draw two defenders. The checkdown begins with the shallow crossing route, in that he uses the same technique in reading the coverage as the “Drive” route. Next will be the tight end, then the split end with the safety valve being the running back. This will be a five step drop by the quarterback.



1992 game 15 San Francisco at Tampa Bay 1st and 10 on SF 20

    Notice on the above play, that the fullback takes a short cut to get to the shallow crossing route that is normally used by a wide receiver. Everything else is normal in the 49er execution of the “Shallow Cross”.

    Quarterback Steve Young (8) sees the flat angle by the outside linebacker to the split end side. Fullback Tom Rathman (44) has protection first responsibility to seal the “A” gap to his side, then release into his route if no linebacker shows

himself in his area of responsibility. As a result of Rathmans release, and the wide route by running back Amp Lee (22), the Buccaneers middle linebacker Brownlow (55) rotates straight back instead of rotating outside to take away the curl zone
area. This opens up the hook route coming open outside of him by wide receiver Jerry Rice (80). Though cornerback Ricky Reynolds has deep help from safety Mark Carrier, Carrier cannot get up quickly enough to take away the route.
The result is first down for San Francisco.
    On this first and ten play, the Niners face a hybrid nickel defense by the  Washington Redskins. The Redksins will show three defensive linemen, three linebackers, and five defensive backs. The Redskins will run a cover two match up zone concept that “bumps” their underneath coverage to adjust to any motion.
    The 49ers will use a shorter split with the split end, and align wide receiver Mike Sherrard, in the fullback position in the backfield. The Redskins will counter with defensive back A.J. Johnson shadowing Sherrard six yards deep from the line of scrimmage. In this coverage Johnson will cover the number two receiver to any three receiver side.
    At the snap, the Redskins will rush only three and leave eight in zone coverage.
    The Niners will bring wide receiver Jerry Rice downfield drawing two defenders away from the primary receiver John Taylor, who is running the shallow cross. If Taylor comes open, Rice will have cleared some defenders downfield for him. Sherrard comes around Taylor and runs the twelve yard hook route. Sherrard draws two defenders himself on the hook
route. Cornerback Darrell Green (28) follows his responsibility and bumpsoutside to pick up the wide route by fullback Tom Rathman. Linebacker Andre Collins (55) releases Taylor inside to linebacker Monte Coleman (51), whom covers Taylor perfectly coming across the formation. Tight end Brent Jones comes across the formation being trailed by linebacker Wilbur Marshall. Quarterback Steve Young (8) finds the open Jones, and fires the ball perfectly into Jones, resulting in a 9 yard gain.
    This play requires attention to detail and flawless execution in which to be successful. For years, the 49ers have utilized their personnel in the best possible fashion to take advantage of their strengths and minimize their weaknesses. This play is one of a long line of plays that point to the precision necessary to sustain play after play, producing long drives.
    The flexibility of the 49ers West Coast offensive system provides a vast number of possibilities for variation in personnel packages, formation variation, and motion variation to produce the desired success.

Conclusion:
    In this article, I have attempted to show how a pass pattern is built  upon, and tweeked upon to take advantage of different defensive packages, coverages, and schemes. Basic patterns can be built upon to take advantage of whatever weaknesses or mismatches that can be found. You don’t have to continuously change plays, but vary the same approach to a point that
it looks like your running many different plays.
    But, as always, it still comes down to precision, execution, and the constant striving for excellence. This also comes down to a commitment by the players and the coaching staff to excel to be the best at what they do.


Contact John Anderson here:   abharvest@bellsouth.net