Every Coach has a play that they “Hang their hat on”. It’s the basis for Each coach’ individual philosophy. There is, at some, moment in every game that is so crucial that the coach will fall back on what he feels will be his best play depending on his personnel, and on his scheme. That Coach will put his faith on the execution of that single play in that critical space in time. I know I have relied on a single play at times. Lombardi relied on the execution of his “Power Sweep” as many as 15-18 times a game, with phenomenal results. Switzer relied on the triple option, and MacPherson used the “Freeze Option”.
In the case of the West Coast Offense (WCO) , Bill Walsh ,
Mike Holmgren, Mike Shanahan, among others, all applied their fortunes on plays
they had confidence in. The WCO was originally designed to defeat Two Deep &
Three Deep Zone coverages. These were the predominate coverages of that time
period. Walsh had originally developed plays that would breakdown these two
coverage groups. But, as defenses changed & and became more complex, the WCO
had to adapt as well. Not since the advent of the Singlewing, the “T” formation,
and the Wishbone had a style of offense created
such problems for defenses.
One play that I have seen over and over again, is one that Walsh introduced back at the beginning. Holmgren and Shanahan have both used this play and have introduced different formations and personnel packages to disguise it with.
The subject of this article is known as “22 - Z IN” or also “Z IN”. This play embodies all that the WCO incorporates. The timed pass routes, timed drops, flexible blocking schemes, and the repetition that is evident in the “Bread & Butter” pass pattern.
“22 - Z IN” was designed for the Running Backs to get to the corner versus the slower Linebackers. It developed into putting their athletic Wide Receivers on hook routes versus Zone and Man coverages.
According to Walsh, Sid Gillman may have developed this route some time ago, but the reads may be somewhat different in the route is executed. (Diagram 1)
The play is designed to key the Strong Safety, and take advantage of his reactions. By keying on the Strong Safety, Gillman and Walsh felt that the integrity of the Zone Defenses could be exploited due to the fact that the Defense couldn’t be strong everywhere (Diagram 2 ).
If the Strong Safety drops back in a Two Deep zone coverage, then the offense would make an adjustment to the route to take advantage of what the defense was giving them as a direct result of holes in Zone coverages. If he comes up into the flat to take away the the Fullback, then he leaves a hole behind him to the Flanker. So, its this mindset that the WCO operates under.
As I mentioned before, the WCO was designed to defeat the concepts of Cover Two and Cover Three. Versus Cover Three, the Flanker has more room I which to work with, but he needs to utilize the inside position that most Cover Three defenses provide. Most Cover Three schemes will tell their Corners to funnel their receivers to the middle of the field where they have Safety help. On 22 Z In, the Tight End is the secondary receiver, and is the shortest throw for the Quarterback to make. This pass will generally be made as the Linebackers or Safety has left their short zone responsibilities to take away the Hook route.
The Tight End executes his crossing route at 4-5 yards, and comes to a stationary position over the backside Guard . If he has a defender on his shoulder, the Tight End is instructed to execute a “Spot” or “Whip” route. This instructs him to collision and turn a 180 degree turn to front side of the play. This is so that he can derive separation from his defender.
In 22 Z In, the Running Back (FB) is the safety valve in any check down type of pattern in the West Coast Offense. The FB executes a “Wide” route that takes him outside the numbers, where he can catch the ball at the line of scrimmage, but never more than two yards past the Line of Scrimmage. The ball should be thrown at a point 12 inches in front of his numbers, so that the FB can catch the ball in stride and not have to slow down to catch the ball. This will result in more cases than not, give him the opportunity to pick up more yardage after the catch. What the FB is taught is to go for sideline, because this area of the field will be “Soft” anyway. He is taught to take it down the sideline for yardage after the catch. The theory is so that the defenses are dropping to take away the Hook route, and the “Spot” route by the Tight End, and there will be a crease at the sideline for additional yardage opportunities.
When 22 Z In is run against Man or Combination coverages, the routes will be adjusted to take advantage of the coverages. For Example, the Flanker will not run a hook, unless specified, but will run an out route at 12 yards or run his pattern across the field. This follows the principle of “settling in Zone coverage and running away from Man coverage”.
The Quarterback will execute a five step drop and a hitch step to settle himself and make his throw. His mind must be made up as his fifth foot hits the ground. I have seen a number of times in the past where Joe Montana, Steve Young, Brett Favre, and Elvis Grbac, have sat in the pocket waiting for someone to come open, and turn and fire without looking to the Running Back in the flat, without looking at him first. They all know where they are supposed to be, this is drilled on countless times in practice.
In speaking of knowing where you are supposed to be, there is something to be said of having a knowledge of coverages, and how your route will need to be adjusted to the coverage in question. On our next diagram we will see how WR Jerry Rice adjusts his route to the coverage. 23 Z in versus Cover 2 Coverage. (Diagram 4)
The New England Patriots are playing a Cover Two Zone out of their Nickel Personnel package. Rice and QB Steve Young both see this by their pre-snap reads, that it will be a Cover Two Zone ( Or Two deep zone coverage ). Rice will adjust his route to the defense. In Cover Two Zone, the Corners are taught to keep outside position and force the receiver to go inside into his help, which in this case is the Safety in Two deep coverage. Rice knows this, and reacts accordingly.
His adjustment calls for him to drive hard outside, aiming
for the outside shoulder of the Corner, and driving him outside to keep his
outside position. This adjustment does two important things:
(a) It provides
more room for his inside curl in the area of the zone
Being attacked,
(b) and moves him away from the Safety who is responsible for the for the
receivers inside breaks on this inside-outside coverage.
And, what's more important is that it gives the quarterback more room, and a better path to throw the ball on timing.
Bill Walsh, Mike Holmgren, and Mike Shanahan, all took a number of plays and them to spread formations to help disguise their intentions. This play is no exception.
The 49ers line up RB Roger Craig in the slot, inside of WR John Taylor. QB Joe Montana sees Free Safety Steve Atwater in the middle of the field , giving a pre-snap read of Cover 3, with both Corners in outside technique, 6-7 yards off the line of scrimmage. Montana will flawlessly read the coverage, and make the proper throw. A throw he has made thousands of times in practice.
LB Simon Fletcher releases flat to cover RB Harry Sydney, and the ball is in the air, even before CB Tyrone Braxton has turned around to make any effort to defend the pass. LB Micheal Brooks was taken up by the route of the Tight End, and F/S Steve Atwater is simply too far away to give any help to Braxton. The Cover 3 Zone structure cannot defend this route without giving the Corner any help. The Niners ran this route all day from different formations, and won big!
Another variation for the 22/23 Z in route, is to motion a back to the side of the call, or even pre-set him outside the tight alignment of the WR. This is done by initially aligning the WR to a spot four yards outside the alignment of the Tight End, and off the line of scrimmage. The play gives the options of either motioning the RB out to the numbers, or presetting him there by alignment. What this does is to allow the RB to all ready be in position for the valve pass, while he runs a four yard stop route.
What the WCO looks for here, is to see if the defense will
bump a defensive Back out to cover the RB, and if they do, it may open an
opportunity to provide for a mismatch with the Tight End inside or the Wide
Receiver. If a mismatch can be found by the WR on a linebacker or on a Strong
Safety, then the purpose will be to take advantage of the mismatch.
Diagram
6.
In Diagram 6 (above), The Packers send RB Daryll Thompson (39) in motion to the wide side of the field, and outside of the alignment of WR Sterling Sharpe. This gives the effect of a pre-alignment , and gives a slightly different dimension to the appearance of the play. The Packers by film study and by gameplanning know that the Lions defense will account for the extra receiver outside by “Bumping” the CB Melvin Jenkins outside to cover the Running Back. This puts Sharpe on Strong Safety Harry Colon (21) and giving underneath help by LB George Jamison. This adjustment by the Lions also sets LB Chris Spielman (54) on Tight End Ed West. Looking to the Weakside of the formation, WR Robert Brooks (87) is across from CB Kevin Scott (38). Scott is in inside technique on Brooks, and aligned 7 yards deep off the line of scrimmage.
In Diagram 4 and in Diagram 6, you will see that the backside receiver is directed to get inside position on the CB, He must drive on the inside shoulder, and try to get inside position, then hook up at 12 yards. But since Scott is in tight coverage, in Diagram 6, Brooks converts his route into a crossing route trying to come open.
At the snap, on the frontside of the play, CB Melvin
Jenkins sits on the stop route by Thompson, effectively covering him. WR
Sterling Sharpe will bend his route in the middle of Cover Two, trying to angle
into the seam in between the Safeties. Safety Harry Colon backpedals into his
deep half zone responsibility, and spreads outside too far. This is the classic
weakness of the Two Deep Zone. LB George Jamison is in tight “Trail” technique,
covering Sharpe underneath and attempting to force him into the deep Safety. But
Sharpe is just too fast. Sharpe will get behind Jamison and inside Colon, and
score from 13 yards out.
Tags – Tags are routes that notify a player that he is to
execute another assignment and disregard his original assignment.
An example
would be to instruct the Running Back to run a shoot route instead of the wide
route on this pattern. So the call
is now “22 Z-IN , FB Shoot”.
In Diagram 7, we see that there are times when the rules for the route are adjusted to fit the situation. Here we see the Tight End adjusting his route to settle down in the underneath seams in the short zones. I have seen on one occasion where the Tight End comes off the ball immediately looking for the ball in the midst of a blitz, this one one that was game- planned and executed well, Obviously as a result of film study.
In Conclusion – the flexibility that comes with the offense is one that is done by design. It has rules for everyone on the field, and what they must do in certain situations. Recognition and adjustments are the keys to success when defenses give you different looks. The addition of alternate routes by use of “tags” allow even greater flexibility in attacking various defenses.